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The On-Orbit Servicing (OOS) working group discussed legal and political implications of developing a 
commercial OOS industry. The group considered the benefits that OOS and Active Debris Removal (ADR) can 
offer the satellite industry, as well as potential disadvantages for international relations between space faring 
nations.
To gain an accurate perspective of stakeholders involved in such a process, the OOS working group held a mock 
hearing for OOS licensing, with members of the working group assigned to represent stakeholders. Working 
group members presented their cases at a simulated domestic regulatory panel, constructed of members 
representing various government ministers, to fully explore stakeholder views. The mock hearings explored the 
challenges faced by OOS and ADR entrepreneurs as well as the benefit of regulation. The groups highlighted 
recommendations to ensure the practicality of OOS and determine how best to encourage licensing and 
regulation of such activities, as summarised below.
1. The United Nations (UN) should provide regulatory guidelines for OOS and ADR.
2. Government agencies should license OOS. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken 
responsibility for licensing commercial space transportation in the United States and this should be 
extended to OOS/ADR missions to enable short-term advancement prior to further UN regulation.
3. Government should support OOS and ADR development to ensure continued demand. This includes 
leading by example on government satellites and potential launch levies to enable on-going ADR funding.
4. All stakeholders should prevent weaponisation of space through transparency of operations.
5. Nations should initiate international cooperation on ADR.
OOS and ADR will ensure sustainable use of satellites, particularly in LEO and GEO, for the coming decades. 
It is through transparency, economic stimulation and close monitoring that such endeavours will be successful.
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1. INTRODUCTION
2. CURRENT INDUSTRY STATE
Since the beginning of the Space Age in 1957, artificial satellites have been launched 
by several countries without much consideration for future activities in space. Objects, 
ranging from small ejectables to defunct satellites and burned-out upper stages of 
rockets, were frequently left in orbit. While larger objects such as the upper stages fall 
back to Earth relatively quickly, a number of dead satellites remain in orbit from the first 
years of the Space Age. In recent years the problems of space debris have become 
more widely known, most notably following the test of the Chinese anti-satellite 
system targeting non-operational Fengyun-1C satellite in 2007 and the collision of 
the American Iridium 33 and the Russian Cosmos 2251 satellites in 2009. In the case 
of Fengyun-1C destruction, 90% of the objects created by the explosion are believed 
to be circling Earth in long-lived orbits, potentially threatening active spacecrafts for 
years. The Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 collision two years later marked the first major 
impact of two spacecraft in orbit and led to a significant increase of individual debris 
objects. Although Cosmos had been decommissioned several years earlier, Iridium 
was operational prior to the catastrophic collision. Experts agree that once debris 
reaches a critical density, a single collision could lead to a runaway chain reaction, 
as new debris is created faster than objects are removed by natural or man-made 
processes. There is no scientific consensus when density for this so-called Kessler 
syndrome will reach the critical threshold, but it is clear that it would render large 
portions of the currently populated orbital bands unusable [1].
The combination of increasing space debris and limited orbital slots makes on-orbit 
servicing (OOS) of satellites both in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geostationary Orbit 
(GEO) increasingly important. In GEO, the availability of orbital slots is inherently 
limited, constrained not only by the minimum safety distance between two objects 
but also by the risk of radio interference. Although LEO orbit availability is not as 
limited in GEO, many more spacecraft have been placed in orbit. The International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) oversees allocation of slots, but in some cases the 
inter-satellite spacing is well below 100 km. Despite remarkable gains in efficiencies 
and performance of communication satellites achieved, the demand for new platforms 
in GEO is expected to continue rising [2], due to rising global demand for wireless 
communication and increasing utilisation of inter-spacecraft communication for 
manned and unmanned systems.
OOS of spacecrafts may help avoid overcrowding and the chain reaction of debris 
creation in both GEO and LEO by several mechanisms. A servicing spacecraft could 
be used to de-orbit larger pieces of debris, thereby reducing the probability of major 
future collisions. It may also re-fuel empty satellites that are otherwise functional 
so that they regain their station-keeping and collision-avoidance capabilities [3]. A 
third particularly interesting possibility for communication service providers owning 
expensive high-performance geostationary platforms is the on-orbit repair of defunct 
satellites. Spacecraft targeted for repair may include newer spacecraft specifically 
designed to be serviceable, but also older spacecraft already in orbit today.  The latter 
category is not only technically challenging, but may also pose significant problems in 
developing new legislation.
To identify and analyse the current state of the OOS industry, the working group 
constructed a simulated regulatory hearing with group members assigned to 
Industries and agencies have developed capabilities related to OOS for many years, 
although its utility for ADR has only recently been met with more widespread interest. 
American and Russian space agencies have carried out operations on multiple targets 
during the past decades [2] and new technologies now enable the extension of 
repair and service missions in space. The stakeholders involved in OOS industry are 
summarised below in Table 1, along with their influence on the industry.  The dynamic 
of this industry is such that there is a conflict of interest between parties as outlined in 
section 3.1.
2.1    Previous On-Orbit Operations
US Space Transportation System (STS) allowed the first capture of a spacecraft in orbit 
for service operations. The five servicing missions to the Hubble Space Telescope 
(HST) are the most famous missions conducted using STS. The choice of HST also 
stands out, as it was the first telescope specifically designed to allow service and repair 
by astronauts. Recovery of Palapa B2 and Westar 6 satellites during STS-51-A in 1984 
marked the first time artificial objects were actively removed from their orbit and, in 
this case, brought back to Earth [2].
More recently, assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) would not have been 
possible without the extensive involvement of astronauts and robotics. Although 
humans played a vital role in the many of the operations performed, robotic systems 
such as the Canadarm2 have demonstrated their extensive reliability and versatility 
required for OOS [5].
represent relevant stakeholders. The hearing was carried out over two hours, where 
each stakeholder demonstrated the effects of a developed OOS industry on their 
interests. This provided an interesting opportunity for group members to adopt and 
further understand the views of different parties. Throughout the simulation, main 
concerns of the stakeholders were identified [4] and analysed. The report uses these 
areas of note to provide recommendations on legal and political issues to address 
during development of the OOS industry.
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2.2    Recent Developments
To address the growing problem of space debris, private organisations and 
government agencies have devised methods to de-orbit large space objects with the 
use of spacecraft. Such OOS is an active research area, with most development work 
performed by or under contract with national space agencies. The lack of research and 
development by commercial industry is likely due the uncertain business value. 
MacDonald, Dettweiler and Associates Ltd (MDA) announced the first commercial 
small-scale refuelling mission in cooperation with Intelsat in 2010. The early design 
paradigm was a GEO fuel-depot satellite to refuel multiple customers’ communications 
satellites. It would also have the capability to move defunct platforms into a graveyard 
orbit and free expensive GEO slots. The project, however, was put on hold in 2012 
after Intelsat dropped out of the collaboration and a new partner could not be found.
NASA has been performing a technology demonstration operation for robotic 
refuelling aboard the ISS since 2011. During Phase I and II of the Robotic Refuelling 
Mission (RRM), the station’s Canadarm2 and its Dextre telemanipulator successfully 
performed a series of refuelling tests on hardware that had not been designed for 
refuelling [3]. Tests with new experimental hardware are continuing.
The German DEOS mission (Deutsche Orbitale Servicing Mission) to be launched in 
late 2017 and the proposed e.Deorbit mission to de-orbit the inoperative ESA satellite 
Envisat are two further examples of OOS. Deorbiting Envisat is particularly crucial as 
this satellite could trigger a self-sustaining chain-reaction of debris creation, should it 
collide with another object.
These missions are examples of OOS in research and development. While there are 
currently no operative OOS systems in orbit, the first full-scale servicing platforms will 
be ready for launch in the coming years. Once the first systems have demonstrated 
their utility, it is likely that commercial industry will become more involved in OOS.
2.3    Legislation & Policy
Currently, policies concerning use of outer space and liability for operations in orbit 
are limited to two major documents: the Outer Space Treaty (Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) [5] and the Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects [6].
Stakeholder Description and Details Interest Power
Government Space 
Agencies
Government space agencies such as NASA, ESA and 
JAXA.
High High
Military/Defence Space based military and defence capabilities. Heavy reli-
ance on space assets (GPS, Earth observation satellites, 
etc.).
High High
Foreign Affairs Foreign affairs deal with any issues that arise with other 
countries, and are interested in ensuring compliance with 
international law and continued peaceful utilisation of 
space.
High Low
Justice Concerned with legal consequences. Low Low
OOS Provider and 
Customer
Parties involved in providing and receiving servicing. High High
UN COPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. Official global forum to discuss OOS policy.
High Low
Launch Industry Provides launch capabilities to place assets in orbit, but 
also produce space debris such as discarded rocket 
bodies.
High High
Satellite Manufacturers OOS may reduce total number of new manufactured 
satellites, but also provides an opportunity to design new 
OOS vehicles.
High High
Satellite Operators Low Low
Satellite Owners High High
Satellite Users Want the functionality of operational satellites but are not 
necessarily concerned with how they get it or how that 
service is maintained.
Low Low
Space Debris 
Community
Interested in debris generation and mitigation mecha-
nisms.
High Low
Insurance Companies Insurance companies request high insurance premiums 
for high-risk missions/operations.
High High
Non-Governmental 
Agencies
Interested in the continued preservation of the near-Earth 
space environment.
High Low
Space-related Research 
Institutions/Academics
Research institutions are often reliant on the functionality 
provided by space assets. They are also interested in the 
continued use of the space environment such as Earth 
observing satellites.
High Low
General Public The general public use satellite derivative services and 
have an inferred interest in their continuance.
Low Low
Table 1: Stakeholders in the OOS industry
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3. WORKING GROUP 
APPROACH
To arrive at appropriate and constructive recommendations to develop OOS industry, 
the working group constructed a mock regulatory hearing with the major stakeholders. 
This procedure allowed the group to assess current industry status from varying points 
of view to further understand the implications of proposed regulation developments.
3.1    Stakeholder Definitions
Working group members were designated representatives of companies and 
customers with appropriate economic leverage while others represented government 
roles typically required for space-faring nations. The major stakeholders considered in 
the mock regulator, hearings are summarised below.
OOS Service Provider: Executive members of CanadaGOOS (Canadian Group for On 
Orbit Servicing) own intellectual property for Canadarm and have access to a modular 
spacecraft bus and space-plane platform. The priorities of the service provider are 
to demonstrate a successful business case whilst meeting the requirements of the 
regulators as well as local and foreign militaries.
OOS Customer: Executive members of EuroSat, a dominant telecommunications 
satellite service provider for Europe, Asia and the Pacific, launches an abundance 
(4-7 units per year) of geosynchronous satellites. The OOS customer seeks economic 
benefits through extending lifetime of future satellites and upgrading existing satellite 
units. The customers has reservations and concerns that the Service Provider might 
provide services to competing companies using capacities derived from the investment 
of EuroSat.
Prospective Investor: An individual has the monetary capability to invest 1-2 billion 
US dollars into the OOS industry. The investor’s main priorities include a significant 
return on investment and a successful business case. To ensure this, the prospective 
investor is keen to see innovation in the industry without restrictive governmental 
oversight; a clear and simple regulatory environment is desirable.
Domestic Regulators: The intergovernmental panel consists of members from the 
Foreign Ministry, the Executive Office of Science and Technology Policy and the 
Ministry of Aviation. The domestic military liaison will also be consulted. The concerns 
of each panellist making up the domestic regulators are as follows:
• Foreign ministry: to ensure compliance with international law and assure 
partners/allies of the continual peaceful uses of outer space.
• Executive Office of Science and Technology Policy: to set domestic policy and 
regulation under the appropriate economic and legal posture and to ensure 
that innovation in the industry is fostered for economic growth. The commercial 
feasibility of new space ventures must be promoted.
• Ministry of Aviation: to license and oversee OOS without discouraging 
innovation. The regulatory power of this body will be extended to include on-
orbit operations.
Domestic Military Liaison: Highly ranked military officials with responsibility in 
classified reconnaissance and Earth observation areas are concerned with controlling 
land, air, sea and space. Its main concerns lie in the potentially hostile capabilities of 
servicing modules, as this is an avenue to weaponisation of space.
Allied Country Delegation: Foreign Ministry of an allied state is seeking to licence 
and regulate OOS, with capabilities to open an international market.
Non-allied Country Delegation (with military attaché): The permanent delegation 
member of the United Nations from a non-allied country is mainly concerned about the 
possible hostile capabilities of OOS units and potential interference with spy satellites. 
The launch of an OOS unit could be viewed as a declaration of war.
3.2    Regulator Hearing Simulation Results
Each stakeholder made position statements prior to simulated regulator hearings. The 
main proposals and issues relating to each of the stakeholders are summarised as 
follows.
3.2.1    OOS Service Provider
An estimated 200 satellites will require servicing by 2020 [1]. OOS is an economically 
viable space venture that provides a commercial opportunity, particularly when 
accounting for graveyard orbit operations.  The majority of technological capabilities 
required for such missions already exists with the remainder feasible in the short- to 
mid-term.
Challenges:  Key legal and political concerns for the service provider are centred 
on mission performance and success, and potential asset damage of units registered 
to other launching states. The Outer Space Treaty (OST 1967) [7] and the Liability 
Convention (LIAB 1972) [6] cover liability of space operations extensively. Article VI of 
OST allocates responsibility to the launching stage, whilst Article VII OST establishes 
liability of the launching state for damages to an “object or its component parts on the 
Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies” as 
elaborated in articles II and III LIAB. Liability from debris generated as a result of OOS 
missions could be inferred by an extension of these documents. This has been broken 
down into a simple question and a potential strategy for removing any ambiguity that 
exists in current literature.
Question:  Who is liable for future damage caused by mission related debris resulting 
from OOS missions and over what time frame is this liability maintained?
Strategy:  The launching state shall remain wholly liable for any future damage caused 
by debris generated as a result of OOS missions in perpetuity.
An additional concern is the potential for OOS capabilities to be used for military/
defence purposes, surveillance or corporate espionage. This would likely result in 
standards and regulations being consolidated, potentially reducing the commercial 
viability of the technology. Any policy that is derived from these concerns should not 
negatively impact the commercial viability of OOS.
Policy concerning the military/defence application of OOS might include extensions 
to existing security protocols to ensure that proximity operations, where an OOS 
satellite comes within 25 km of another launching state’s asset, are fully transparent. 
One strategy is to publicly announce proposed mission profiles, allowing foreign 
states opportunity to raise any concerns. This is particularly important when it comes 
to potential proximity of the OOS satellite with ’unregistered’ satellites.
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3.2.2    OOS Customer
Challenges: The majority of the customer’s policy-related concerns arise from the lack 
of regulations. The customer would like to comply with the respective government’s 
security rules in order to have its satellites serviced. If the security policy created were 
too onerous, however, the mission costs would increase and reduce the customer’s 
financial gain.
Benefits of regulation: The potential OOS customer will most likely pressure policy-
makers to create regulations. As a result, the customer will be willing to comply or 
consider another state for launch.  Without regulation, the customer would hesitate to 
sign contracts for OOS missions.
3.2.3    Prospective Investors
Challenges: Investors and sources of private funding for OOS are concerned not only 
with the success of the mission but also the commercial value of the service. The 
amount of freedom and degree of self-regulation are of high importance for the ability 
of an OOS company to be commercially viable and competitive. Financial supporters 
hold considerable leverage in a company at a national and international level. As a 
result, this leverage can be utilised to establish security and influence the design of a 
working industry. Despite the obvious challenges, this will be beneficial to the industry.
Benefits of regulation: To initiate international discussion, countries should compile 
a set of goals and requirements to enable a successful and sustainable agreement. 
These should be used as criteria when developing the policy that will guide the future 
OOS industry. A combination of private and public funding is likely important to ensure 
the on-going success of the industry. Potential funding streams include launch levies 
that would contribute to on-going ADR and OOS as well as the licensing of satellite 
spots, particularly in GEO.
3.2.4    Domestic Regulators
Challenges: The regulatory committee must determine the assignment of 
liability, both for mission success and long-term damages. Although launching states 
bear ultimate responsibility for damage to national and international space assets 
during OOS, it is not economically feasible for governments to cover all liability for 
commercial activities, particularly in the short term. In addition, regulatory bodies 
must have adequate access to proprietary servicer and provider component and 
procedural specifications to guarantee minimal safety requirements are met, as both 
the servicing vehicle and the vehicle being serviced must be assessed for risks in 
the event of mission failure. Finally, the domestic regulators must ensure security of 
communications and ground control, particularly the confidentiality of information, 
and prevent the weaponisation of space.
Benefits of regulation:  To satisfy these regulatory issues, OOS missions should be 
covered by mandatory private insurance. Insurance requirements may be partitioned 
into short-term based on mission success and long-term damage liability to third-party 
space assets or contamination of orbital sectors caused by space debris. The long-
term insurance may not be cheaper but is required for a minimum number of years 
to mitigate costs to the launching state. To obtain proprietary information without 
discouraging private sector involvement, a trusted third party bound by non-disclosure 
agreements could verify compliance during safety reviews.
3.2.5    Domestic Military Liaison
Challenges:  The domestic military liaison shares many views with domestic 
regulators, although security is a more pressing concern. Countries and commercial 
operators prioritise the security and confidentiality of their assets in space, making 
any collaboration with other entities for servicing or debris removal challenging. Both 
satellites undergoing servicing and satellites in close proximity to those being serviced 
are at risk for having proprietary information inadvertently exposed.
With the capability to control or destroy other satellites, OOS has great potential 
to be utilised as a space weapon. If misused, OOS could lead to a lack of trust and 
a potential arms race in space. System security is required to prevent misuse, but 
‘military only’ control could lead to suspicion and is unlikely to be cost effective. On the 
other hand, increased transparency or poorly managed commercial companies could 
enable others to exploit vulnerabilities or expose technology and security information. 
Securing the homeland and proprietary information is of utmost importance.
Benefits of regulation: Despite being an economically beneficial endeavour, OOS 
has the potential to be hazardous. Various entities will almost certainly attempt to 
develop weaponisation capabilities of units, even if prevention programs are in place. 
The government requires strong regulations to reduce this risk and ensure national 
security. Many of these considerations involve other nations, so risks must be managed 
to maintain sound foreign relations. Preventing weaponisation of space is crucial to 
allow easy access and sustainability of essential services.
3.2.6    Allied Country Delegation
Challenges: Allied countries generally support development of OOS regulations 
and recognise that an over-zealous military could restrict technological developments. 
Since the development of OOS capabilities may also enhance trade relations and 
technology sharing, allied countries should address trade embargoes and restrictions 
on import/export related material to maximise access for appropriate parties. The 
potential weaponisation of space and the lack of clarity surrounding liability sharing of 
spacecraft/launch vehicle are concerns that must be addressed prior to any action. For 
this reason, regulation must be developed such that the industry is monitored but not 
restricted.
Benefits of Regulation: Orbit manipulation by another entity has the potential to 
damage third party satellites. Results from such actions may cripple other nations, 
particularly following damage to economically critical GEO assets.
Regulation will set precedent and establish custom that carries weight in international 
law. Furthermore, establishing a forum to notify interested parties and discuss OOS in 
a proactive manner would greatly benefit allied countries. 
3.2.7    Non-allied Country Delegation (with military attaché)
Challenges: Non-allied country delegations are concerned with weaponisation of 
space due to new capabilities of launched OOS units. Addressing security concerns 
surrounding the mission, such as how to prevent hacking or hostile takeover, are of 
utmost importance. 
Benefits of Regulation:  Due to the security concerns surrounding ADR and OOS 
capabilities amongst foreign delegations, transparency is required to ensure mission 
success and to aid communication with non-allied countries. Regulating these missions 
would increase cooperation and aid in the mitigation of potential weaponisation.
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS
5. REFERENCES
The development of an OOS industry is both technologically and economically viable. 
Servicing hardware in orbit will reduce space debris and mission cost as units become 
optimised for servicing. OOS of current satellites will either increase mission life or 
clear orbits for new missions. Additionally, maturation of the industry will encourage 
development in robotics and autonomous systems. The major stakeholders outlined 
all demonstrate conflicts of interest concerning the industry, and so establishment of 
a regulatory body to monitor future orbital activities is required. This body could also 
work to satisfy the need for transparency and confidence building between nations to 
ensure a secure industry. Based on the results of the simulated hearing the working 
group makes the following recommendations:
1. Extension of Outer Space Treaty. Currently, the country from which a spacecraft 
is launched bears ultimate responsibility and liability for the asset placed in orbit. 
In scenarios where objects are built in one country, launched by another country 
and serviced by a third country, the liability for damage inflicted on the serviced 
object itself or assets owned other parties may need to be reassigned. The group 
recommends that UNCOPUOS discuss OOS and ADR regulations with the outlook 
to develop working guidelines to be ratified by nations participating in OOS 
activities, including customers and providers.  
2. Government Agency Role extended to monitoring and licensing OOS and 
ADR activities. UN regulation of ADR and OOS activities is likely to be a complex 
and long-term requirement. The working group recommends that national 
agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States, 
be expanded to regulate and monitor such activities to maintain government 
relations and manage liability. Bodies such as the FAA have proven to be efficient 
in similar endeavours such as the regulation of commercial space transportation.  
3. Governmental support of OOS/ADR industry. The conflict of interest and lack 
of current demand for OOS services renders support and funding by government 
institutions crucial for the development of the OOS industry. By creating demand 
for services, the government can provide the initial foundation of the industry 
and keep investors interested in the business. Governments may conduct 
technology demonstrator missions through supporting national space agencies, 
commissioning service missions for military or other governmental spacecraft and 
implementing additional launch levies to contribute to future ADR.  
4. Prevent weaponisation of space. OOS clearly creates new possibilities for the 
weaponisation of space. Confidence in OOS must be established by demanding 
sufficient transparency of all operations. As this contrasts the confidentiality 
requirements of certain governmental missions, solutions to provide transparency 
whilst keeping military secrecy uncompromised should be discussed on an 
international level.  
5. Initiate global debris removal initiative. To prevent runaway debris creation 
and create demand for OOS services, the working group recommends initiating a 
global project to remove defunct and unused objects from orbit as a potential UN-
led initiative.  As there is currently no urgent demand for debris removal missions 
from the commercial industry, projects are not likely to be initiated until it is more 
economically viable. Considering the current extent of debris, the possibility of 
the situation seriously worsening to the critical threshold cannot be ruled out.  
6. Initiate regulations for active debris removal. Regulations to remove or prevent 
the creation of space debris are currently limited to non-binding documents such 
as the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. The working group recommends 
extension of existing guidelines and discussion of options to introduce fees for 
occupying orbital slots in both GEO and LEO. This would not only create demand 
for ADR services, but would also make the extension of spacecraft operations 
more economically viable.
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